Multilateral negotiations with private side-deals: a multiplicity example by Roberto Serrano & Sandeep Baliga
Multilateral negotiations with private side−deals: a
multiplicity example 
Sandeep Baliga Roberto Serrano




We study a multilateral negotiation procedure that allows for "partial agreements" in which
responders are told only their own shares. Applications of our model include negotiations
under "joint and several liability." Unlike previous models of multilateral bargaining with
exit, we find that there are multiple equilibrium outcomes.
We thank Jerry Green, Amy Salsbury, Kathy Spier, Mike Wheeler and Robert Wilson for their comments. Serrano also
acknowledges an Alfred P. Sloan Foundation research fellowship.
Citation: Baliga, Sandeep and Roberto Serrano, (2001) "Multilateral negotiations with private side−deals: a multiplicity
example." Economics Bulletin, Vol. 3, No. 1 pp. 1−7
Submitted: February 12, 2001.  Accepted: February 19, 2001.
URL: http://www.economicsbulletin.com/2001/volume3/EB−01C70003A.pdf1 Introduction
In this paper we study a multilateral negotiation procedure with two essen-
tial features: (1) the proposals are made “privately,” that is, each responder
knows only the share oﬀered to him or her when it is his or her turn to re-
spond, and (2) the possibility of reaching multilateral consensus through
“partial agreements” among fewer parties at diﬀerent points in time is in-
troduced. These two features facilitate the interpretation of our multilateral
procedure as one in which private “side-deals” can be worked out.
Although we could write down the standard model of bargaining over
a surplus, we shall study the formally equivalent problem of negotiations
in the presence of “joint and several liability.”1 Suppose that two or more
players (the defendants) are trying to settle a dispute where they have to
divide an amount of C dollars that they owe to a claimant. We assume that
they face “joint and several liability”: ﬁrst, they are each liable for the
whole amount in dispute; second, if some players manage to settle earlier,
the others are left to divide up any part of C that remains to be paid. In
this situation, proposals among the defendants could be made “privately,”
as a way to avoid further disputes. We assume each of the defendants has
enough funds to settle individually but would, of course, prefer that one
of the others paid up. In addition, each defendant prefers to settle sooner
rather than later in order to avoid interest charges: the claimant is owed
C dollars to be paid immediately and thus has the right to collect interest.
We have in mind cases in which a ﬁrm is trying to collect damages from a
group of other ﬁrms, or a landlord who, at the end of the leasing period,
may impose a penalty on the tenants that were occupying the apartment.
We shall not model the role of the claimant explicitly: it will be limited to
collect the amount C, whenever agreed.
A description of our procedure follows. One defendant oﬀers a division
of the cost C to the others. Each of the other defendants is told only the
amount he or she pays. Therefore, the negotiations are conducted “piece-
meal,” in the sense that the proposer tries to convince each responder that
his or her oﬀered share is reasonable (regardless of the shares oﬀered to
others). Next, the responders accept or reject the oﬀer. If any defendant
agrees to pay the amount he is oﬀered, he tells the others how much he is
paying. If there remain defendants who have rejected the ﬁrst proposer’s
oﬀer, one of them, determined by some protocol, proposes a division of the
1In this context, feature (2) above is based on section 4(a) of the Uniform Contribution
among Tortfeasors Act.
1remaining cost to the ﬁrst proposer and the other defendants who rejected
the initial oﬀer. The game continues in this fashion potentially ad inﬁnitum
till everyone has agreed to a division of C. An acceptor pays the amount
agreed once ﬁnal agreement has been reached on how to split the total cost.
That is, all payments to the claimant must be made in the same period and
therefore even the earlier acceptors are subject to interest charges.
For the case of two players, our extensive form reduces to Rubinstein’s
(1982) game of alternating oﬀers. A question that arises in the multilat-
eral setting is the equilibrium concept to employ. A player may receive an
out-of-equilibrium oﬀer and not know the oﬀers to the other players. The
equilibrium concept we work with is perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE).
Unlike the case of perfect information where an oﬀer is made publicly to all
responders, our main result is that there are multiple equilibrium outcomes
(Example 1). However, there is a unique PBE outcome supported by “in-
dependent” beliefs, which coincides with the unique equilibrium outcome of
the game with public oﬀers.
In the multilateral bargaining literature, ours is a model with exit and
imperfect information. The ﬁrst extension of Rubinstein’s model to multilat-
eral settings is due to Shaked, generalized by Herrero (1985).2 These authors
ﬁnd that, although there is a unique stationary subgame perfect equilibrium
(SPE), if players are suﬃciently patient, every feasible outcome is supported
by a SPE. Their game allows only unanimous agreements to be executed,
and has perfect information (the proposal is publicly made and responses
are sequential). Haller (1986) ﬁnds that this result is robust if responses are
simultaneous. Jun (1987) and Chae and Yang (1994) study extensive forms
with pairwise meetings among the agents, in which the possibility of exit
or “partial agreements” is introduced. A unique SPE is found regardless
of the discount factor. Krishna and Serrano (1996) present a model with
exit where a proposal is made to all agents, and uniqueness also obtains.
Two recent papers have established the robustness of this result based on
exit. Vannetelbosch (1999) shows that uniqueness obtains even with a no-
tion of rationalizability, weaker than SPE; and Huang (1999) establishes that
uniqueness is still the result in a model that combines unanimity and exit,
since oﬀers can be made both conditional and unconditional to each respon-
der. Finally, Baliga and Serrano (1995) introduce imperfect information in
the unanimity game and multiplicity persists.
2For an account of Shaked’s result, see Osborne and Rubinstein (1990).
22 Negotiating under “Joint and Several Liability”
We consider situations where a set of players N = {1,2,...,n} negotiate
over the way in which a cost of size C is divided among them. They face
“joint and several liability,” so that in principle each of them is liable for
the whole amount. We shall assume that the claimant is owed C dollars to
be paid immediately. If the defendants delay payments, the debt increases
taking into account interest charges. Let r>0 be the per period interest
(this is a simplifying assumption that does not aﬀect the results; we could
have a “personalized” interest rate ri > 0 for each defendant i).
We shall denote an oﬀer to the set of players S by xS. An oﬀer to N
will also be denoted simply by x: it is a vector x =( x1,x 2,...,x n)i n
which xi is player i’s share of the cost. The set of possible oﬀers to N is




For some S ⊂ N, we write

j∈S xj as x(S); also T \ S is the set of
players who are members of T but are not members of S.
The extensive form of the bargaining procedure in which n defendants
bargain over a cost of size C is denoted by Gi(N;C) and is deﬁned
recursively. If N = {i}, Gi(N;C) consists of an oﬀer made (to himself)
by player i, which is immediately accepted. For any S ⊆ N, i ∈ S and
C  ≤ C, deﬁne Gi(S;C ) as follows. In period 0 player i makes an oﬀer
xS. Each player j in S\{i} receives an envelope containing only his or her
part of the cost xj. All players j  = i respond simultaneously by accepting
or rejecting xj.3 If player j accepts xj, he or she pays (1 + r)txj after
all the others agree to a division of C in period t.
Let A ⊆ S\{i} be the set of players who accept player i’s oﬀer in period
0. All the players who accept show their envelopes. If A = S \{ i} then
all players including i pay their shares immediately. If ∅  = A ⊂ S \{ i},
t h e ni np e r i o d1 , Gj(S \ A;C  − xS(A)) is played where j is the smallest
index in S \ A greater than i (modulo S). If A = ∅, t h e ni np e r i o d1 ,
Gj(S;C ) is played, where j is determined as above.
As for evaluating payoﬀs, player i’s payoﬀ from paying a share xi of C
in period t is vi((1 + r)txi) where vi :I R → I R is a strictly decreasing
function, vi(∞)=−∞. That is, while there are no personal discount rates,
players prefer to settle earlier rather than later in order to avoid the interest
3This assumption is made to avoid problems of perfection at the response stage, as well
as any further incidence of oﬀ-equilibrium path beliefs.
3charges. The payoﬀ to players from perpetual disagreement is assumed to
be −∞.
3 Equilibrium
With at least three defendants, our extensive form contains many continu-
ation games that are not proper subgames: because the proposal is made
“piecemeal” in personalized envelopes, each responder does not know the
amounts oﬀered to the others when it is his or her turn to respond. Thus,
we have a game of imperfect information and the concept of SPE cannot
help reﬁne the set of Nash equilibria.
We adopt as our equilibrium notion that of perfect Bayesian equilibrium
(PBE) that combines the following elements:
(I) Sequential rationality in the players’ actions given their beliefs: at
every information set and given the beliefs held at that point, every player
uses a best response to the other players’ strategies.
(I.a) Proposers’ information sets are always singletons: a proposer
chooses the oﬀer to be a best response to the other players’ strategies, taking
into account the continuation equilibrium.
(I.b) If |N| =2 , responders’ information sets are always singletons
and if |N| > 2, respondents’ information sets are never singletons. Given
their beliefs following any oﬀer, they choose their response rules as a best
reply to the other players’ strategies, taking into account the continuation
equilibrium.
(II) Updating of beliefs using Bayes’ rule whenever possible: if |N| > 2
and a responder is oﬀered his or her equilibrium share, he or she believes
that the equilibrium proposal has been made.
(III) Arbitrary beliefs after oﬀ-equilibrium actions.
4 Result
Our main result is a counterexample to uniqueness. Indeed, there are multi-
ple PBE outcomes in the game Gi(N;C) when |N|≥3. This is the content
of Example 1.
Example 1: let N = {1,2,3} and consider the game G1(N;C). Let
0 ≤   ≤ rC












4The strategies and beliefs that support it are as follows:
• (i) In period 0, player 1 proposes the given split.
• (ii) In period 0, player j =2 ,3 accepts an oﬀer x if and only if
xj ≤
(1+r)C
3+2r −  .
• (iii) In period 0, if player j =2 ,3 is oﬀered a share lower than the
equilibrium one, he or she believes that the other responder is oﬀered
the equilibrium share; if he or she is proposed a higher share, he or
she believes (if feasible) that so is the other responder.
• (iv) Following a rejection of only one responder in period 0, the unique
SPE is played in the two-player continuation.
• (v) Following a unanimous rejection in period t, the same equilibrium
is played in period t + 1 with the natural permutation of roles (e.g.,
player 2makes the new proposal in period 1).
To check that this is a PBE, it suﬃces to account for all one-time de-
viations. Consider period 0 (the exercise for any other period is identical).
Player 1 compares his or her share to the well deﬁned share (possibly in-
creased by interest charges) that he or she gets from any deviation. Players
2and 3, on the other hand, act optimally given their beliefs no matter
what oﬀer they receive. To check all this, the reader will ﬁnd the following





(3 + r)(3 + 2r)
<
r(2+ r)2
(3 − r2)(3 + 2r)
.
Remark: Note that the usual multiplicity example, as constructed by
Shaked, would not work here. That is, the extreme points of the payoﬀ
space cannot be supported by (or even approximated by) PBEs. For ex-
ample, the split (0,0,C) can never be a PBE outcome of G1(N;C) because
player 3 would have an incentive to deviate by rejecting player 1’s proposal.
In Example 1, beliefs are correlated when responders are asked to pay
more than the equilibrium amount, that is, they believe that the proposer
deviated from the equilibrium in the two envelopes he or she wrote. This
creates a “boot-strap” self-conﬁrming theory, in which responder j rejects
the oﬀer because he or she believes that responder k will also reject it.
5This poses the question of whether a reﬁnement of PBE that rules out this
correlation of oﬀ-equilibrium path beliefs would be eﬀective. For example,
consider the following requirement on oﬀ-equilibrium beliefs:
(III’) Independent beliefs after oﬀ-equilibrium actions: Consider the
game Gi(N;C)w i t h|N| > 2and let x be the proposal made in
equilibrium by player i; denote by y an oﬀ-equilibrium proposal. Following
an oﬀ-equilibrium oﬀered share yj  = xj, if yj+x(N\{i,j}) ≤ C, responder
j believes that all other responders have been oﬀered their components of
x. If yj + x(N \{ i,j}) >C , beliefs are unrestricted.
As shown in Baliga and Serrano (1998), there exists a unique PBE out-
come of Gi(N;C) compatible with independent beliefs. This outcome would
also be the unique SPE outcome of the game with public oﬀers (Krishna and
Serrano (1996)). In this PBE, player i pays a share y∗
i − β∗ = C
|N|(1+r)−r
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